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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—S

very difficult and perhaps impossible to negotiate in a broad multilateral context.

One is led to conclude that regional or sub-regional approaches to the control of arms transfers are likely to be more promising than the development of broad controls on a worldwide basis. Most states tend to establish their force requirements on the basis of the military capabilities of neighboring states rather than states outside their region. Furthermore, security conditions vary significantly from one region or sub-region to another. In Latin America, for example, there is a relatively low level of tension, arms sophistication and perception of external threat. In contrast, the Near East is an area where tensions and threat perceptions are high and large amounts of advanced weaponry are present. Even within this region there are important differences between the problems of the Persian Gulf and the rivalry between Israel and the Arab confrontation states. In addition to the variations in arms demand among regions, a further obstacle the global controls arises from the major differences which exist in the military, political and economic interests of the various arms supplier states in various regions or sub-regions. Thus restraints most suppliers might find acceptable in one region might be totally unacceptable to some or to all if applied in other regions.

Restraints on arms transfers on a regional basis might come about as a result of formal arrangements or tacit understandings among regional recipients, supplier states, or combinations of both. In some regions, the most appropriate approach might be arrangements among recipients. In others, it may be more fruitful to seek mutual restraints among suppliers to the area.

However, our analysis suggests that formidable political and psychological obstacles would have to be overcome in most regions to attain meaningful restraint arrangements, whether based on supplier understandings or agreement among recipients.

In conclusion, it should be kept in mind that neither the US and its Allies, on the one hand, nor the Warsaw Pact countries on the other, would allow outside powers to limit or regulate the pattern of arms transfers among their respective alliance groupings. Therefore, proposals for multilateral arms transfer restraint, to have any chance of adoption, must be limited to arms shipments from industrial states to the developing countries.

Most developing countries would perceive any such arms transfer restraint proposals as discriminatory and designed to codify and perpetuate their military inferiority, particularly if one or more of the larger industrial states were the author of the proposal. While less developed countries are aware that heavy arms expenditures conflict with their economic and social development goals, they will jealously insist upon their sovereign right to establish their own security and development priorities and will resent advice, however well-intentioned, from the major industrial powers.

If one or another industrial country should decide to press actively for multilateral arms limitations on developing countries, the more public such efforts the more antipathy they will inspire among the governments to whom they are addressed. And the greater the resentment among the developing countries concerned, the less enthusiasm other supplier countries will have to join in the endeavor.

The foregoing discussion suggests that the most promising multilateral restraint proposals will be those that derive from initiatives taken by leaders in the region or regions concerned. This is not to argue that the larger industrial countries can play no useful role in this matter; on the contrary, their support will be helpful and perhaps essential to the success of any control arrange-

ments worked out by recipient state addition, one must always hold open possibility of arriving at informal and identical understandings concerning transfers to specific areas or of certain particularly sensitive types of weapons, when where conditions for such understandings exist. We will continue to examine our arms exports carefully to determine unilateral restraints would be effective meeting our interests and preventing constrained arms buildups. We will also continue to seek bilateral and multilateral understandings through diplomatic contact with other suppliers and recipients to achieve restraints, when such efforts appear likely to succeed. Our analysis suggests, however, that the efforts of industrial states will be more likely to bear fruit if they are pursued through quiet diplomatic exchanges than if they are exposed to full glare of international publicity.

## INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators LEAHY, JAVITS, McGOVERN, HASKELL, TUNNEY, GARY HART, and myself, I intend to introduce a joint resolution calling upon the President to initiate a formal investigation into the death of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean Ambassador to the United States and Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs under Salvadore Allende.

As my colleagues are aware, Mr. Letelier and his coworker, Ronni Moffitt, were brutally murdered Tuesday when a bomb attached to the Letelier car exploded on Sheridan Circle in Washington, D.C. Both the District of Columbia police and the FBI are investigating.

The circumstances surrounding Orlando Letelier's death and the means by which it was accomplished call for more than a routine investigation. The circumstances raise the question of assassination at the direction of the Chilean junta.

Letelier was in the United States because he could no longer live safely in Chile, where he had been imprisoned and tortured by the military junta which overthrew the Allende government. Letelier was able to leave prison and Chile only through the intervention of scholars and public figures in other Latin American countries and the United States.

During his stay in the United States, Letelier was an eloquent spokesman for the cause of human rights in Chile. More recently, his criticism began to focus on the role of international finance in supporting the junta and extending its reactionary practices. Letelier, as a respected economist and diplomat, became a visible and significant opponent of Chile's ruling military clique.

Less than 2 weeks ago, the junta which had jailed and reluctantly released him decreed that Letelier was no longer a Chilean citizen. This action was supported by an allegation that Letelier had prevented the junta from obtaining a foreign loan.

Letelier's life was threatened at this time. Two other high ranking officials from the Allende government both living in exile, have been murdered in circumstances similar to those surrounding the

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DE ignored, political assassinations may become as frequent in our streets as they are in the streets of many unfortunate European and Latin American countries already. It is thus crucial to search out any direct or indirect links between any government or its agencies and the September 21 bombing.

The resolution requires a public, unclassified report to the Congress within 120 days of enactment. The report must certify that a full and complete investigation has been undertaken. In addition, it requires the results of the inquiry into any government involvement be made public.

As I indicated earlier, the questions raised by the death of Letelier need answers which can only be provided by the investigative resources of the executive branch. In the absence of those answers, I do not believe that the United States can continue to risk even the possibility that our economic assistance, of whatsoever kind and magnitude, may help support a regime in some way implicated in acts of international assassination.

This resolution therefore provides that the failure of the President to provide the results of the investigation with respect to possible Chilean governmental involvement will automatically terminate all assistance to that country. Unless the President can and does assure Congress and the American people that a thorough investigation into this affair has fully satisfied him that there is no evidence of direct or indirect complicity on the part of the present Chilean Government, the United States should have no hesitancy in curtailing the amount of economic assistance we provide to that country.

Because of documented violations of human rights, the United States has already cut off military assistance to Chile. In addition, we have put a limit on the amounts of economic assistance which we provide that country. We should have no hesitation in eliminating even that reduced level of assistance if it enhances the security of a government which may count assassination among its political options.

Mr. President, I regret having to introduce this resolution, but I would re-

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